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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RELIABLE FURNITURE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.,
WESTERN GENERAL AGENCY, and

11656

GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU,
Defendants and Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The brief filed by Respondents raises points not covered
by the Judgment of the trial court (R-34) or the Brief of
Appellant. Accordingly, we feel it essential to file this reply
brief to meet such arguments.
POINT 1.
NEGOTIATION OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A FULL AND FINAL SETTLEMENT
As Appellant pointed out in its first brief, page 6, release is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and has
not been pleaded by any Respondent in this case. Now, in
Respondent's brief we are faced with another affirmative
defense not pleaded-accord and satisfaction (page 12, Respondent's brief).
Utah cases have steadfastly held the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction to be an affirmative defense that must be
1

pleaded. Rule 8, (c) U.R.C.P. F.M.A. Financial Corporation v
Build, 17 U. 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, ( 1965), Hintze vs Seaich,
20 U. 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202 (1968).
The endorsement and negotiation of a check bearing a
release statement does not constitute a release, or accord and
satisfaction as a matter of law. Dillman v Massey Ferguson,
Inc. 13 U. 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962). In that case a check
was delivered with an accompanying letter stating it represented "the amount due in full to complete recent buy-back
on your account". Under the facts of that case, a further suit
as to matters between the parties was not barred.
In Bennett v Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc. 18 U. 2d 186,
417 P.2d 761, (1966), there was a dispute between employer
and employee as to commissions due. The employee endorsed
and negotiated a check with the wording "Payment in full
of the account stated below-Endorsement of check by payee
is sufficient receipt." This language did not constitute a release, or accord and satisfaction, since the employee disputed
the amount as payment in full.
Hintze vs Seaich, supra, involved yet another dispute
between employer and employee as to commissions due. The
employee endorsed and cashed a check with this language
on it: "This is the balance of your account in full." A finding
of the trial court that this did not constitute an accord and
satisfaction (or release) was upheld by this court.
Respondent's brief (page 13) anticipates an argument that
payment of an undisputed amount due will support a release
for a disputed amount. It cites Williston to support
this argument. However, it ignores the fact that this
court has ruled just the opposite, namely, that payment of
a lesser undisputed sum will not release the debtor from a
claim to a larger disputed amount. See F.M.A. Financial
2

Corporation vs Build, supra, and Reliable Furniture Co. vs
Fidelity and Guaranty Inc. Underwriters, 16 U. 2d 211, 398
P.2d 685 (1965).
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO RATIFICATION OF THE EVENTS OF
JUNE 19 BY THE ACTION OF SAM HERSCOVITZ.
At the outset, "ratification" would appear to be another
designation for the doctrine of "waiver"; and although not
specifically set out in 8 (c), U.R.C.P., it is an affirmative
defense that must be pleaded. It has never been pleaded by
any defendant.
In Respondent's brief, certain Utah cases are cited in
support of this point and criticism leveled at Purvis vs Penn
R. Co., 198 F.2d 631 (3rd C.C.A. 1952) as inapplicable. A brief
review will show Purvis to be much closer factually than any
of the citations of Respondent.
The first authority, 77 ALR 2 Page 427, states a general
rule as to ratification. This same annotation, at Page 434,
describes an essential element of ratification, intention:
"While a contract voidable for duress may be ratified, either by express consent, or by conduct inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that of
approval, still the intention to ratify is an essential
element and is at the foundation of the doctrine of
waiver or ratification."
Again, at page 449 it is stated:
"Lack of intention to ratify has also been held to
preclude a finding of ratification."
The facts in our present case, viewed (as they must be)
favorably to plaintiff, reveal anything but an intention to
ratify.
3

The testimony was that Herscovitz believed, when he endorsed and deposited the draft, that he was not concluding
the claim against American. R-140, 141. He flatly denied any
intention to ratify, R-141 line 21:
"Q.

A.

And by so doing, you intended to be paid for
any claim arising out of the business interruption loss, didn't you?
Absolutely no intent whatsoever."

This testimony is supported by his objections to the size
of the settlement to Jack Day, (R-137, 210), his immediate
call to Mr. Holmes, his insurance agent (R-104) and consultation with counsel (R-106), his holding the draft for eight
or nine days (R-106) and his immediate filing of suit on August 11, 1961 (R-1).
The next authority Respondent presents is State vs Barlow, .107 U.292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944). The factual background
of that case is a bigamy prosecution; the defendant claimed
Utah anti-poligamy laws were the result of duress and coercion from the federal government It is indeed difficult to
see its applicability to the present case.
Next Respondent offers Farrington vs Granite Stake Fire
Insurance Co., 120 U. 109, 232 P.2d 754 (1951). This case
upheld a jury verdict against an insurer. The plea of ratification, or waiver, was (page 118) "* * * not controlling in
the case." The issue was not determined as a matter of law,
as Respondent seeks to do in our case. Factually the case is
far different from ours, as the attempted recission was first
made over one year following the fire and knowledge of all
the facts.
LeVine vs Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 105 P.2d (1910),
did not deal with waiver or ratification as a matter of law,
4

but as one of fact. Delay in claiming fraud for 11 months after
discovery of it, without protest, supported a finding of ratification.
Next cited is Taylor v. Moore, 87 U.493, 51 P.2d 222
(1935). The holding was simply that a purchaser of lands
who delayed any attempt to rescind for nearly 3 years after
learning of the fraud was not entitled to rescind. He was,
however, entitled to a jury trial on the question of damages
resulting from the fraud.
The final authority Respondent relies on here is McKellar
Real Estate v. Paxton,, 62 U. 97, 218 P. 128 (1923). This case
holds a purchaser of real property cannot keep the land
and rescind the contract. It is difficult to argue with this holding, but it does not appear relevant here.
It may be that Respondents would prevail with a jury
verdict on the issue of ratification. The jury could indeed find
that Sam Herscovitz intended to ratify the $12,900 settlement and is bound thereby. If a jury so found, we would have
no quarrel if the evidence is sufficient to support such a
finding. But clearly, the evidence is not sufficient to rule as
a matter of law that ratification was accomplished. As was
stated in Purvis, the entire transaction and surrounding circumstances must be considered, not simply the fact of endorsement of a draft at a particular time and place. Any reasonable look at the evidence will show there is a jury question to be resolved on the issue of ratification.

Respondent raises a number of questions in its Brief,
all centering on the question of what "compelled" Reliable
to endorse and negotiate the draft when it did. These are
fair questions to put to Herscovitz, and to argue the answers
forthcoming to the jury. But this approach completely misses
the thrust of the complaint itself. What is the distinction be5

tween the present case, and a hypothetical one where the
person seeking relief had been paid in cash and retained it
for 9 days (or some other figure) without further protest?
In our case, Reliable v. Fidelity & Guaranty, 16 U.2d 211,
398 P.2d 685 (1965) has ruled that tender of the money is
not essential to the maintenance of this suit. Is there a magic
difference, then, between pocketing the proceeds of the settlement immediately or in holding it for 9 days? In either
case, tender has not been made prior to suit, and the time
question is simply one for the jury.
It should be remembered that Reliable desperately need-

ed money during this period. Also, to get the stock loss payment, Herscovitz had to sign a proof of loss for $12,900 on
the business interruption loss. True, the proof of loss was
not a receipt, but it was a statement under oath that would
certainly be used against him in any further attempt to recover his actual loss. Under these circumstances, his action
of the facts to be
in holding the draft for 9 days is just
reviewed on the question of release, not the controlling fact
as a matter of law.
POINT III.
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD.
Respondent gives lip service to the rule that. evidence
must be reviewed favorably to the party suffering from an
involuntary dismissal, but in fact recites disputed facts favorable to his position.
Appellant's brief sets out specifically the elements of
fraud and the facts relied upon to support that claim. Respondent's brief attacks the evidence supporting the element of
reliance. Herscovitz testified he relied upon the misrepresentations of Day and Ball (R-138):
6

"Q.

A.

So you didn't rely on what he said at all as
having any bearing in any way?
Of course I did."

Also, at (R-102):
"Q.

Did you sign this Proof of Loss, Mr. Herscovitz, on the business interruption claim?

A.

At approximately six-thirty I reconciled myself
that I had to sign it if I was going to get the
draft for the inventory."

To attempt to counter this by saying Herscovitz was
aware of his rights (Respondent's brief page 21) is meaningless. He knew what they were doing was wrong, but he
certainly believed (and relied upon) what they told him. Respondent seems to assume that since Herscovitz realized they
were acting improperly he must therefore have known the
statements made were false. This is patently wrong! Just
because something is improper does not mean it is not a fact.
When the general agent for American and Fidelity told Herscovitz the companies' position, Herscovitz of course believed
that is in fact what it was. Any reasonable person would. Nor
does his consultation with counsel contradict this evidence.
Advice from counsel as to what the companies could legally
and properly do in no way changes Herscovitz' reliance upon
what they in fact were doing. There is no evidence that Her---·
-·
scovitz knew of the falsity of the representations. Instead,
the evidence uniformly shows that Herscovitz did believe the
statements, did rely on them, and took such action under the
circumstances to protect Reliable as best he could.
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POINT IV.
THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO IMPOSE LIABILITY UPON AMERICAN, WESTERN AND GAB FOR
THE ACTIONS OF MR. DAY AND MR. BALL.
The trial court made no findings in its judgment on the
issue of agency or apparent authority. R-34-36. Respondents
have now seized upon this in another attempt to bolster the
judgment.
As to Western, Jack Day was Vice President and half
owner of that business. If he did not have authority, or ap'
parent authority to speak and act for Western
it is hard to
visualize a fact situation where any person could bind a company.
As to American, Jack Day (through Western) was the
general agent of American in the State of Utah. A showing
the principal did not authorize the particular act of the agent
will not defeat recovery where, as here, the agent clearly has
apparent or ostensible authority to represent the principal.
Se Farrington vs Granite State Fire Ins., 120 U. 109, 232
P.2d 754 (1951).
Finally, the issues of liability I to GAB are directed to
the cause of action in fraud for damage. Ball was the representative of GAB in charge of the settlement of the interruption claim in the American policy. He was the person to
negotiate the claim with Reliable, and the statement he made
was clearly in the course of conducting his principal's business, that of settling the claim of Reliable on the American
policy. The other elements of fraud being present, the evidence will support a jury verdict against GAB for the misrepresentations of Ball in the transaction.
8

CONCLUSION
The arguments raised by the Respondent are, we submit,
essentially arguments for the jury. There is, of course, evidence Respondent can effectively use to support its position
that Reliable, by endorsement of the check, released its claim
against Respondents. But to so hold as a matter of law is
to seize upon
factor, the passage of 8 or 9 days
time, and concentrate on that fact to the exclusion of all other
evidence.
The transaction must be viewed as a whole in the light
of circumstances then prevailing. As such, a jury could well
find the settlement complained of was the direct result of the
duress and fraudulent representations of defendants through
their agents.
I

A new trial should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
PETE N. VLAHOS
Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
2324 Adams Avenue
Ogden, Utah
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
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